Impact
Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in Erlang OTP stdlib (erl_tar module), hexpm hex_core (hex_erl_tar module), hexpm hex (mix_hex_erl_tar module) and erlang rebar3 (r3_hex_erl_tar module) allows an attacker who supplies a tar archive to cause a denial of service via a crafted GNU sparse member.
When erl_tar:extract/1,2 writes a member to disk, erl_tar:stream_to_file_loop/3 reads it in chunks of 65536 bytes by default. For a GNU sparse member whose sparse map ends before its real size, erl_tar:do_sparse_read/3 matches its trailing-hole clause before its zero-length clause. After the chunk is used up, the trailing-hole clause reads zero bytes, does not advance the position, and recurses forever. A 2048-byte archive keeps the extracting process and one scheduler busy until the process is killed. The {max_size, N} option prevents this only when N is below the real size of the member. Extraction with the memory option is not affected.
hex_core ships its own copy of erl_tar as hex_erl_tar, and Hex and rebar3 ship hex_core with prefixed module names (mix_hex_erl_tar and r3_hex_erl_tar). These copies contain the same code and do not call stdlib's erl_tar, so they are affected on any OTP version. OTP 28 is not affected, but an application running on OTP 28 is affected if it extracts archives through an affected version of hex_core, Hex or rebar3.
Workarounds
Pass {chunks, N} together with {max_size, N}, with the same value N, to erl_tar:extract/2. Extraction then rejects any member larger than N, and reads each remaining member in one call, so the loop cannot occur.
Alternatively, extract with the memory option and write the returned files to disk in the application.
Affected/Unaffected Versions
A version larger than or equal to one of the listed patched versions is unaffected; otherwise, a version that satisfies an expression listed under affected versions is affected, and if it does not, it is unaffected.
The documentation of the new OTP version scheme describes how versions should be compared. Note that versions used prior to OTP 17.0, when the new OTP version scheme was introduced, are never listed since it is not well defined how to compare those versions.
Credits
Thanks to Eric Meadows-Jönsson for finding and responsibly disclosing this vulnerability to the Erlang/OTP project.
Thanks to Eric Meadows-Jönsson for providing a remediation for this vulnerability.
Impact
Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in Erlang OTP stdlib (
erl_tarmodule), hexpm hex_core (hex_erl_tarmodule), hexpm hex (mix_hex_erl_tarmodule) and erlang rebar3 (r3_hex_erl_tarmodule) allows an attacker who supplies a tar archive to cause a denial of service via a crafted GNU sparse member.When
erl_tar:extract/1,2writes a member to disk,erl_tar:stream_to_file_loop/3reads it in chunks of 65536 bytes by default. For a GNU sparse member whose sparse map ends before its real size,erl_tar:do_sparse_read/3matches its trailing-hole clause before its zero-length clause. After the chunk is used up, the trailing-hole clause reads zero bytes, does not advance the position, and recurses forever. A 2048-byte archive keeps the extracting process and one scheduler busy until the process is killed. The{max_size, N}option prevents this only when N is below the real size of the member. Extraction with thememoryoption is not affected.hex_core ships its own copy of
erl_tarashex_erl_tar, and Hex and rebar3 ship hex_core with prefixed module names (mix_hex_erl_tarandr3_hex_erl_tar). These copies contain the same code and do not call stdlib'serl_tar, so they are affected on any OTP version. OTP 28 is not affected, but an application running on OTP 28 is affected if it extracts archives through an affected version of hex_core, Hex or rebar3.Workarounds
Pass
{chunks, N}together with{max_size, N}, with the same value N, toerl_tar:extract/2. Extraction then rejects any member larger than N, and reads each remaining member in one call, so the loop cannot occur.Alternatively, extract with the
memoryoption and write the returned files to disk in the application.Affected/Unaffected Versions
A version larger than or equal to one of the listed patched versions is unaffected; otherwise, a version that satisfies an expression listed under affected versions is affected, and if it does not, it is unaffected.
The documentation of the new OTP version scheme describes how versions should be compared. Note that versions used prior to OTP 17.0, when the new OTP version scheme was introduced, are never listed since it is not well defined how to compare those versions.
Credits
Thanks to Eric Meadows-Jönsson for finding and responsibly disclosing this vulnerability to the Erlang/OTP project.
Thanks to Eric Meadows-Jönsson for providing a remediation for this vulnerability.