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Unbounded recursion in List.to_string/1 and List.to_charlist/1 error path can hang the calling process

Moderate
josevalim published GHSA-jf5q-v438-665c Aug 28, 2026

Package

elixir (otp)

Affected versions

>= 1.15.0 and < 1.18.5
>= 1.19.0 and < 1.19.6
>= 1.20.0 and < 1.20.4

Patched versions

1.18.5
1.19.6
1.20.4

Description

Summary

Uncontrolled recursion in the Elixir standard library lets an attacker who controls a list passed to inspect/1, List.to_string/1, or List.to_charlist/1 exhaust a BEAM node's memory. Inspect.List decides whether a list is a charlist by checking only a bounded prefix, then converts the entire list, so a list with a long printable prefix followed by a single invalid element is mis-classified and the conversion fails. The failure path renders the same list again, re-entering the same branch and looping without bound. Any code path that inspects or stringifies an attacker-influenced list is affected, with error and log formatting particularly exposed because the defect lives in the failure path itself.

Details

Inspect.List in lib/elixir/lib/inspect.ex decides whether a list is a charlist by checking only the first :printable_limit elements (4096 by default), then converts the whole list. A list with a longer printable prefix followed by an invalid element therefore passes the check but fails the conversion, raising an ArgumentError. Inspecting such a list directly, or passing it to List.to_string/1 or List.to_charlist/1, crashes for this reason.

The crash is what starts the loop. The rescue clause in lib/elixir/lib/list.ex builds its error message by inspecting the same list that just failed, which re-enters the same branch and raises again. The nested inspection is an argument to raise, so the recursion is not in tail position and every level is retained: the process stack grows monotonically while each cycle re-walks the list and allocates another message binary. Garbage collection reclaims the discarded binaries but cannot shrink the retained stack, so the process grows until it hits a max_heap_size limit or exhausts the node.

Below the printable limit there is no bug: the invalid element falls inside the counter, the list renders in ordinary bracket form, and a single ArgumentError propagates normally.

PoC

  1. Build a list whose first elements exceed the default printable limit and are all printable ASCII code points, for example 5000 copies of the a code point.
  2. Append one element that is not a valid code point, such as an atom, an integer above the Unicode maximum, or an improper tail.
  3. Pass that list to inspect/1, List.to_string/1, or List.to_charlist/1.
  4. Observe that the call never returns. Sampling the process shows stack size climbing monotonically and memory growing steadily.
  5. To bound the observation, run the call in a task with a timeout.

Impact

A single call on an attacker-influenced list consumes memory without bound until the calling process is killed by a heap limit or, by default, the entire BEAM node runs out of memory and takes down every process on it. The exposure is worst in error reporting and logging, where a malformed charlist silently hangs the reporting process and never produces a log entry, so the failure can go unattributed.

Workaround

For users who cannot immediately upgrade to a patched version, you can patch the existing behaviour by installing a global inspect function. It requires Elixir v1.13+ and it can be done at the top of your application's start callback:

Inspect.Opts.default_inspect_fun(fn term, opts ->
  Inspect.inspect(term, %{opts | charlists: :as_lists})
end)

The charlist branch is then never entered, so the conversion cannot fail and the error path cannot recurse. The trade-off is global: charlists render in bracket form everywhere in the application, including logs and error reports, so ~c"abc" inspects as [97, 98, 99].

As a containment measure, setting a max_heap_size process flag on processes that may inspect untrusted terms caps the damage: the runtime kills the offending process once it crosses the limit, so a single call can no longer exhaust the node. This does not prevent the recursion and the affected process still dies without returning, so it is an alternative to the inspect-function change for those earlier than v1.13+ (although those users are advised to update immediately).

References

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Local
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability High
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE ID

CVE-2026-75758

Weaknesses

Uncontrolled Recursion

The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place, consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack. Learn more on MITRE.

Credits