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Mareforma: verify_bundle never checks a per-claim signature

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 7, 2026 in mareforma/mareforma • Updated Nov 19, 2026

Package

pip mareforma (pip)

Affected versions

>= 0.3.0, < 0.3.8

Patched versions

0.3.8

Description

What's wrong

verify_bundle documents that it verifies "a bundle's DSSE envelope AND each per-claim signature", lists "per-claim signature failure" among its raised errors, and promises that partial verification never surfaces "an authenticated bundle that contains some invalid claims" as success. The code does not do this. The JSON-LD predicate built by JSONLDExporter._claim_node carries no signature material (there is no signatureBundle field on the node), so the verify loop has nothing cryptographic to check per claim. It only re-derives each claim's canonical-statement digest from the node fields and compares it to the signed subject list:

chain_input = _signing.canonical_statement({...node fields...}, node.get("evidence") or {})
expected = hashlib.sha256(chain_input).hexdigest()
if subjects[subject_name] != expected:
    raise BundleVerificationError(...)

That digest check is self-referential: the exporter signs both the subject digests and the predicate nodes with the same key. It confirms the bundle is internally consistent as built, not that each claim's purported asserter ever validly signed it. The existing test test_tampered_claim_text_in_predicate_fails asserts a "digest mismatch", confirming digest-only verification is the actual contract.

Severity and impact

Medium. All trust in a bundle collapses to the single exporter key. Whoever holds it (or a malicious exporter) can emit a bundle containing claims whose asserter signatures are missing, invalid, or forged, and verify_bundle returns success. A relying party reading the docstring believes per-claim authenticity was verified when it was not. Security-sensitive because this is the trust boundary the SCITT-style export exists to provide.

Location

  • mareforma/export_bundle.py:20 module docstring claims verification checks "every per-claim signature inside predicate"
  • mareforma/export_bundle.py:183 verify_bundle docstring promises per-claim signature verification and a per-claim signature failure error
  • mareforma/export_bundle.py:254 verify loop only recomputes and compares canonical-statement digests
  • mareforma/exporters/jsonld.py:178 _claim_node emits no signature field, so the predicate carries nothing to verify per claim

Fix direction

Two honest options. Either export each claim's signature bundle in the JSON-LD predicate and have verify_bundle cryptographically verify it (including the claim_id and subject binding) against the claim's asserter or validator key, raising on the first failure as documented. Or, if per-claim verification is out of scope for the bundle format, correct the module docstring and the verify_bundle docstring to state exactly what is verified: the bundle-level DSSE signature plus internal subject-digest consistency, with per-claim asserter signatures explicitly not checked.

Do red/green TDD: add a regression test that fails on main, then make it pass.

Quality bar

SOLID, DRY, KISS. Clean, readable, well-tested code. No new errors, warnings, or test failures; the full suite stays green on all supported Python versions.

References

@felipeyanez felipeyanez published to mareforma/mareforma Jul 7, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Nov 18, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Nov 19, 2026
Reviewed Nov 19, 2026
Last updated Nov 19, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction Passive
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity High
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity High
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(10th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-71536

GHSA ID

GHSA-hxh5-gp44-rc6p

Source code

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