294-tls-1.3.txt

Filename: 294-tls-1.3.txt
Title: TLS 1.3 Migration
Authors: Isis Lovecruft
Created: 11 December 2017
Updated: 23 January 2018
Status: Draft

This proposal is currently in draft state and should be periodically
revised as we research how much of our idiosyncratic older TLS uses
can be removed.

1. Motivation

   TLS 1.3 is a substantial redesign over previous versions of TLS, with several
   significant protocol changes which should likely provide Tor implementations
   with not only greater security but an improved ability to blend into "normal"
   TLS traffic on the internet, due to its improvements in encrypting more
   portions of the handshake.

   Tor implementations may utilise the new TLS 1.3 EncryptedExtensions feature
   to define arbitrary encrypted TLS extensions to encompass our less standard
   (ab)uses of TLS.  Additionally, several new Elliptic Curve (EC) based
   signature algorithms, including Ed25519 and Ed448, are included within the
   base specification including a single specification for EC point compression
   for each supported curve, further decreasing our reliance on
   Tor-protocol-specific uses and extensions (and implementation details).

   Other new features which Tor implementations might take advantage of include
   improved (server-side) stateless session resumption, which might be usable
   for OPs to resume sessions with their guards, for example after network
   disconnection or router IP address reassignment.

2. Summary

   Everything that's currently TLS 1.2: make it use TLS 1.3.  KABLAM.  DONE.

   For an excellent summary of differences between TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, see
   [TLS-1.3-DIFFERENCES].

3. Specification

3.1. Link Subprotocol 4

   (We call it "Link v4" here, but reserve whichever is the subsequently
   available subprotocol version at the time.)

3.2. TLS Session Resumption & Compression

   As before, implementations MUST NOT allow TLS session resumption.  In the
   event that it might be decided in the future that OR implementations would
   benefit from 0-RTT, we can re-evaluate this decision and its security
   considerations in a separate proposal.

   Compression has been removed from TLS in version 1.3, so we no longer need to
   make recommendations against its usage.

3.3. Handshake Protocol

3.3.1. Negotiation

   The initiator sends the following four sets of options, as defined in §4.1.1
   of [TLS-1.3-NEGOTIATION]:
   >
   >  - A list of cipher suites which indicates the AEAD algorithm/HKDF hash
   >    pairs which the client supports.
   >  - A “supported_groups” (Section 4.2.7) extension which indicates the
   >    (EC)DHE groups which the client supports and a “key_share” (Section 4.2.8)
   >    extension which contains (EC)DHE shares for some or all of these groups.
   >  - A “signature_algorithms” (Section 4.2.3) extension which indicates the
   >    signature algorithms which the client can accept.
   >  - A “pre_shared_key” (Section 4.2.11) extension which contains a list of
   >    symmetric key identities known to the client and a “psk_key_exchange_modes”
   >    (Section 4.2.9) extension which indicates the key exchange modes that may be
   >    used with PSKs.

   In our case, the initiator MUST leaave the PSK section blank and MUST include
   the "key_share" extension, and the responder proceeds to select a ECDHE
   group, including its "key_share" in the response ServerHello.

3.3.2. ClientHello

   To initiate a v4 handshake, the client sends a TLS1.3 ClientHello with the
   following options:

     - The "legacy_version" field MUST be set to "TLS 1.2 (0x0303)".  TLS 1.3
       REQUIRES this.  (Actual version negotiation is done via the
       "supported_versions" extension.  See §5.1 of this proposal for details of
       the case where a TLS-1.3 capable initiator finds themself talking to a
       node which does not support TLS 1.3 and/or doesn't support v4.)

     - The "random" field MUST be filled with 32 bytes of securely generated
       randomness.

     - The "legacy_session_id" MUST be set to a new pseudorandom value each
       time, regardless of whether the initiator has previously opened either a
       TLS1.2 or TLS1.3 connection to the other side.

     - The "legacy_compression_methods" MUST be set to a single null byte,
       indicating no compression is supported.  (This is the only valid setting
       for this field in TLS1.3, since there is no longer any compression
       support.)

     - The "cipher_suites" should be set to 
       "TLS13-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256:TLS13-AES-128-GCM-SHA256:TLS13-AES-256-GCM-SHA384:"
       This is the DEFAULT cipher suite list for OpenSSL 1.1.1.  While an
       argument could be made for customisation to remove the AES-128 option, we
       choose to attempt to blend in which the majority of other TLS-1.3
       clients, since this portion of the handshake is unencrypted.
       (If the initiator actually means to begin a v3 protocol connection, they
       send these ciphersuites anyway, cf. §5.2 of this proposal.)

     - The "supported_groups" MUST include "X25519" and SHOULD NOT include any
       of the NIST P-* groups.

     - The "signature_algorithms" MUST include "ed25519 (0x0807)".
       Implementations MAY advertise support for other signature schemes,
       including "ed448 (0x0808)", however they MUST NOT advertise support for
       ECDSA schemes due to the perils of secure implementation.

   The initiator MUST NOT send any "pre_shared_key" or "psk_key_exchange_modes"
   extensions.

   The details of the "signature_algorithms" choice depends upon the final
   standardisation of PKIX. [IETF-PKIX]

3.3.2.1. ClientHello Extensions

   From [TLS-1.3_SIGNATURE_ALGOS]:
   >
   > The “signature_algorithms_cert” extension was added to allow implementatations
   > which supported different sets of algorithms for certificates and in TLS itself
   > to clearly signal their capabilities. TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD also
   > process this extension.

   In order to support cross-certification, the initiator's ClientHello MUST
   include the "signature_algorithms_cert" extension, in order to signal that
   some certificate chains (one in particular) will include a certificate signed
   using RSA-PKCSv1-SHA1:

     - The "signature_algorithms_cert" MUST include the legacy algorithm
       "rsa_pkcs1_sha1(0x0201)".

3.3.3. ServerHello

   To respond to a TLS 1.3 ClientHello which supports the v4 link handshake
   protocol, the responder sends a ServerHello with the following options:

     - The "legacy_version" field MUST be set to "TLS 1.2 (0x0303)".  TLS 1.3
       REQUIRES this.  (Actual version negotiation is done via the
       "supported_versions" extension.  See §5.1 of this proposal for details of
       the case where a TLS-1.3 capable initiator finds themself talking to a
       node which does not support TLS 1.3 and/or doesn't support v4.)

     - The "random" field MUST be filled with 32 bytes of securely generated
       randomness.

     - The "legacy_session_id_echo" field MUST be filled with the contents of
       the "legacy_session_id" from the initiator's ClientHello.

     - The "cipher_suite" field MUST be set to "TLS13-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256".

     - The "legacy_compression_method" MUST be set to a single null byte,
       indicating no compression is supported.  (This is the only valid setting
       for this field in TLS1.3, since there is no longer any compression
       support.)

   XXX structure and "key_share" response (XXX can we pre-generate a cache of
   XXX key_shares?)

3.3.3.1 ServerHello Extensions

   XXX what extensions do we need?

4. Implementation Details

4.1. Certificate Chains and Cross-Certifications

   TLS 1.3 specifies that a certificate in a chain SHOULD be directly certified by
   the preceding certificate in the chain.  This seems to imply that OR
   implementations SHOULD NOT do the DAG-like construction normally implied by
   cross-certification between the master Ed25519 identity key and the master
   RSA-1024 identity key.

   Instead, since certificate chains are expected to be linear, we'll need three
   certificate chains included in the same handshake:

     1. EdMaster->EdSigning, EdSigning->Link
     2. EdMaster->RSALegacy
     3. RSALegacy->EdMaster

   where A->B denotes that the certificate containing B has been signed with key A.

4.2. Removal of AUTHENTICATE, CLIENT_AUTHENTICATE, and CERTS cells

   XXX see prop#224 and RFC5705 and compare

   XXX when can we remove our "renegotiation" handshake completely?

5. Compatibility

5.1. TLS 1.2 version negotiation

   From [TLS-1.3-DIFFERENCES]:
   >
   > The “supported_versions” ClientHello extension can be used to
   > negotiate the version of TLS to use, in preference to the
   > legacy_version field of the ClientHello.

   If an OR does not receive a ClientHello with a "supported_versions"
   extenstion, it MUST fallback to using the Tor Link subprotocols v3.  That is,
   the OR MUST immediately fallback to TLS 1.2 (or v3 with TLS 1.3, cf. the next
   section) and, following both Tor's "renegotiation" and "in-protocol" version
   negotiation mechanisms, immediately send a VERSIONS cell.

   Otherwise, upon seeing a "supported_versions" in the ClientHello set to
   0x0304, the OR should procede with Tor's Link subprotocol 4.

5.2. Preparing Tor's v3 Link Subprotocol for TLS 1.3

   Some changes to the current v3 Link protocol are required, and these MUST
   be backported, since implementations which are currently compiled against
   TLS1.3-supporting OpenSSLs fail to establish any connections due to:

     - failing to include any ciphersuite candidates which are TLS1.3 compatible

   This is likely to be accomplished by:

     1. Prefacing our v3 ciphersuite lists with
        TLS13-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256:TLS13-AES-128-GCM-SHA256:TLS13-AES-256-GCM-SHA384:
        (We could also retroactively change our custom cipher suite list to be
        the HIGH cipher suites, since this includes all TLS 1.3 suites.)
     2. Calling SSL_CTX_set1_groups() to set the supported groups (should be set
        to "X25519:P-256"). [TLS-1.3_SET1_GROUPS]
     3. Taking care that older OpenSSLs, which instead have the concept of
        "curves" not groups, should have their equivalent TLS context settings
        in place.  [TLS-1.3_SET1_GROUPS] mentions that "The curve functions were
        first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2. The equivalent group functions were first
        added to OpenSSL 1.1.1".

   However more steps may need to be taken.

   [XXX are there any more steps necessary? —isis]

6. Security Implications

   XXX evaluate the static RSA attack and its effects on TLS1.2/TLS1.3
   XXX dual-operable protocols and determine if they apply
   XXX
   XXX Jager, T., Schwenk, J. and J. Somorovsky, "On the Security
   XXX of TLS 1.3 and QUIC Against Weaknesses in PKCS#1 v1.5 Encryption",
   XXX Proceedings of ACM CCS 2015 , 2015.
   XXX https://www.nds.rub.de/media/nds/veroeffentlichungen/2015/08/21/Tls13QuicAttacks.pdf

7. Performance and Scalability

8. Availability and External Deployment

8.1. OpenSSL Availability and Interoperability

   Implementation should be delayed until the stable release of OpenSSL 1.1.1.

   OpenSSL 1.1.1 will be binary and API compatible with OpenSSL 1.1.0, so in
   preparation we might wish to revise our current usage to OpenSSL 1.1.0 to be
   prepared.

   From Matt Caswell in [OPENSSL-BLOG-TLS-1.3]:
   >
   > OpenSSL 1.1.1 will not be released until (at least) TLSv1.3 is
   > finalised. In the meantime the OpenSSL git master branch contains
   > our development TLSv1.3 code which can be used for testing purposes
   > (i.e. it is not for production use). You can check which draft
   > TLSv1.3 version is implemented in any particular OpenSSL checkout
   > by examining the value of the TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_TXT macro in the
   > tls1.h header file. This macro will be removed when the final
   > version of the standard is released.
   >
   > In order to compile OpenSSL with TLSv1.3 support you must use the
   > “enable-tls1_3” option to “config” or “Configure”.
   >
   > Currently OpenSSL has implemented the “draft-20” version of
   > TLSv1.3. Many other libraries are still using older draft versions in
   > their implementations. Notably many popular browsers are using
   > “draft-18”. This is a common source of interoperability
   > problems. Interoperability of the draft-18 version has been tested
   > with BoringSSL, NSS and picotls.
   >
   > Within the OpenSSL git source code repository there are two branches:
   > “tls1.3-draft-18” and “tls1.3-draft-19”, which implement the older
   > TLSv1.3 draft versions. In order to test interoperability with other
   > TLSv1.3 implementations you may need to use one of those
   > branches. Note that those branches are considered temporary and are
   > likely to be removed in the future when they are no longer needed.

   At the time of its release, we may wish to test interoperability with other
   implementation(s).

9. Future Directions

   The implementation of this proposal would greatly ease the
   implementation difficulty and maintenance requirements for some
   other possible future beneficial areas of work.

9.1. TLS Handshake Composability

   Handshake composition (i.e. hybrid handshakes) in TLS 1.3 is incredibly
   straightforward.

   For example, provided we had a Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH)
   based implementation with a sane API, composition of Elliptic Curve
   Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and SIDH handshakes would be a trivial codebase
   addition (~10-20 lines of code, for others who have implemented this).

   Our current circuit-layer protocol safeguards the majority of our security
   and anonymity guarantees, while our TLS layer has historically been either a
   stop-gap and/or an attempted (albeit usually not-so-successful) obfuscation
   mechanism.  However, our TLS usage has, in many cases, successfully, through
   combination with the circuit layer cryptography, prevented more then a few
   otherwise horrendous bugs.  After our circuit-layer protocol is upgraded to a
   hybrid post-quantum secure protocol (prop#269 and prop#XXX), and in order to
   ensure that our TLS layer continues to act in this manner as a stop gap —
   including within threat models which include adversaries capable of recording
   traffic now and decrypting with a potential quantum computer in the future —
   our TLS layer should also provide safety against such a quantum-capable
   adversary.


A. References

[TLS-1.3-DIFFERENCES]:
   https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.html#rfc.section.1.3
[OPENSSL-BLOG-TLS-1.3]:
   https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2017/05/04/tlsv1.3/
[TLS-1.3-NEGOTIATION]:
   https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.html#rfc.section.4.1.1
[IETF-PKIX]:
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/
[TLS-1.3_SET1_GROUPS]:
   https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_groups.html
[TLS-1.3_SIGNATURE_ALGOS]:
   https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/draft-ietf-tls-tls13.html#signature-algorithms