Summary
During installation TimescaleDB creates a telemetry job that is runs as the installation user. The queries run as part of the telemetry data collection were not run with a locked down search_path allowing malicious users to create functions that would be executed by the telemetry job leading to privilege escalation.
In order to be able to take advantage of this vulnerability, a user would need to be able to create objects in a database and then get a superuser to install TimescaleDB into their database. When TimescaleDB is installed as trusted extension non-superusers can install the extension without help from a superuser.
Fix
Upgrade to TimescaleDB 2.9.3.
Workarounds
As a mitigation the search_path of the user running the telemetry job can be locked down to not include schemas writable by other users.
Affected Platforms
The vulnerability is not exploitable on instances in Timescale Cloud and Managed Service for TimescaleDB due to additional security provisions in place on those platforms.
Summary
During installation TimescaleDB creates a telemetry job that is runs as the installation user. The queries run as part of the telemetry data collection were not run with a locked down
search_pathallowing malicious users to create functions that would be executed by the telemetry job leading to privilege escalation.In order to be able to take advantage of this vulnerability, a user would need to be able to create objects in a database and then get a superuser to install TimescaleDB into their database. When TimescaleDB is installed as trusted extension non-superusers can install the extension without help from a superuser.
Fix
Upgrade to TimescaleDB 2.9.3.
Workarounds
As a mitigation the
search_pathof the user running the telemetry job can be locked down to not include schemas writable by other users.Affected Platforms
The vulnerability is not exploitable on instances in Timescale Cloud and Managed Service for TimescaleDB due to additional security provisions in place on those platforms.