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aws.go
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aws.go
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package aws
import (
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
regexp "github.com/wasilibs/go-re2"
"github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog/v3/pkg/common"
"github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog/v3/pkg/detectors"
"github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog/v3/pkg/pb/detectorspb"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws/credentials"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws/session"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/sns"
)
type scanner struct {
verificationClient *http.Client
skipIDs map[string]struct{}
}
// resourceTypes derived from: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_identifiers.html#identifiers-unique-ids
var resourceTypes = map[string]string{
"ABIA": "AWS STS service bearer token",
"ACCA": "Context-specific credential",
"AGPA": "User group",
"AIDA": "IAM user",
"AIPA": "Amazon EC2 instance profile",
"AKIA": "Access key",
"ANPA": "Managed policy",
"ANVA": "Version in a managed policy",
"APKA": "Public key",
"AROA": "Role",
"ASCA": "Certificate",
"ASIA": "Temporary (AWS STS) access key IDs",
}
var thinkstCanaryList = map[string]struct{}{
"052310077262": {},
"171436882533": {},
"534261010715": {},
"595918472158": {},
"717712589309": {},
"819147034852": {},
"992382622183": {},
}
const thinkstMessage = "This is an AWS canary token generated at canarytokens.org, and was not set off; learn more here: https://trufflesecurity.com/canaries"
var thinkstKnockoffsCanaryList = map[string]struct{}{
"044858866125": {},
"251535659677": {},
"344043088457": {},
"351906852752": {},
"390477818340": {},
"426127672474": {},
"427150556519": {},
"439872796651": {},
"445142720921": {},
"465867158099": {},
"637958123769": {},
"693412236332": {},
"732624840810": {},
"735421457923": {},
"959235150393": {},
"982842642351": {},
}
const thinkstKnockoffsMessage = "This is an off brand AWS Canary inspired by canarytokens.org. It wasn't set off; learn more here: https://trufflesecurity.com/canaries"
func New(opts ...func(*scanner)) *scanner {
scanner := &scanner{
skipIDs: map[string]struct{}{},
}
for _, opt := range opts {
opt(scanner)
}
return scanner
}
func WithSkipIDs(skipIDs []string) func(*scanner) {
return func(s *scanner) {
ids := map[string]struct{}{}
for _, id := range skipIDs {
ids[id] = struct{}{}
}
s.skipIDs = ids
}
}
// Ensure the scanner satisfies the interface at compile time.
var _ detectors.Detector = (*scanner)(nil)
var (
defaultVerificationClient = common.SaneHttpClient()
// Make sure that your group is surrounded in boundary characters such as below to reduce false positives.
// Key types are from this list https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_identifiers.html#identifiers-unique-ids
idPat = regexp.MustCompile(`\b((AKIA|ABIA|ACCA)[0-9A-Z]{16})\b`)
secretPat = regexp.MustCompile(`[^A-Za-z0-9+\/]{0,1}([A-Za-z0-9+\/]{40})[^A-Za-z0-9+\/]{0,1}`)
// Hashes, like those for git, do technically match the secret pattern.
// But they are extremely unlikely to be generated as an actual AWS secret.
// So when we find them, if they're not verified, we should ignore the result.
falsePositiveSecretCheck = regexp.MustCompile(`[a-f0-9]{40}`)
)
// Keywords are used for efficiently pre-filtering chunks.
// Use identifiers in the secret preferably, or the provider name.
func (s scanner) Keywords() []string {
return []string{
"AKIA",
"ABIA",
"ACCA",
}
}
func GetHash(input string) string {
data := []byte(input)
hasher := sha256.New()
hasher.Write(data)
return hex.EncodeToString(hasher.Sum(nil))
}
func GetHMAC(key []byte, data []byte) []byte {
hasher := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
hasher.Write(data)
return hasher.Sum(nil)
}
// FromData will find and optionally verify AWS secrets in a given set of bytes.
func (s scanner) FromData(ctx context.Context, verify bool, data []byte) (results []detectors.Result, err error) {
dataStr := string(data)
idMatches := idPat.FindAllStringSubmatch(dataStr, -1)
secretMatches := secretPat.FindAllStringSubmatch(dataStr, -1)
for _, idMatch := range idMatches {
if len(idMatch) != 3 {
continue
}
resIDMatch := strings.TrimSpace(idMatch[1])
if s.skipIDs != nil {
if _, ok := s.skipIDs[resIDMatch]; ok {
continue
}
}
for _, secretMatch := range secretMatches {
if len(secretMatch) != 2 {
continue
}
resSecretMatch := strings.TrimSpace(secretMatch[1])
s1 := detectors.Result{
DetectorType: detectorspb.DetectorType_AWS,
Raw: []byte(resIDMatch),
Redacted: resIDMatch,
RawV2: []byte(resIDMatch + resSecretMatch),
ExtraData: map[string]string{
"resource_type": resourceTypes[idMatch[2]],
},
}
account, err := common.GetAccountNumFromAWSID(resIDMatch)
if err == nil {
s1.ExtraData["account"] = account
}
if _, ok := thinkstCanaryList[account]; ok {
s1.ExtraData["is_canary"] = "true"
s1.ExtraData["message"] = thinkstMessage
if verify {
verified, arn, err := s.verifyCanary(resIDMatch, resSecretMatch)
if verified {
s1.Verified = true
}
if arn != "" {
s1.ExtraData["arn"] = arn
}
if err != nil {
s1.SetVerificationError(err, resSecretMatch)
}
}
}
if _, ok := thinkstKnockoffsCanaryList[account]; ok {
s1.ExtraData["is_canary"] = "true"
s1.ExtraData["message"] = thinkstKnockoffsMessage
if verify {
verified, arn, err := s.verifyCanary(resIDMatch, resSecretMatch)
if verified {
s1.Verified = true
}
if arn != "" {
s1.ExtraData["arn"] = arn
}
if err != nil {
s1.SetVerificationError(err, resSecretMatch)
}
}
}
if verify && (s1.ExtraData["is_canary"] != "true") {
isVerified, extraData, verificationErr := s.verifyMatch(ctx, resIDMatch, resSecretMatch, true)
s1.Verified = isVerified
// It'd be good to log when calculated account value does not match
// the account value from verification. Should only be edge cases at most.
// if extraData["account"] != s1.ExtraData["account"] && extraData["account"] != "" {//log here}
// Append the extraData to the existing ExtraData map.
// This will overwrite with the new verified values.
for k, v := range extraData {
s1.ExtraData[k] = v
}
if verificationErr != nil {
s1.SetVerificationError(verificationErr, resSecretMatch)
}
}
if !s1.Verified {
// Unverified results that contain common test words are probably not secrets
if detectors.IsKnownFalsePositive(resSecretMatch, detectors.DefaultFalsePositives, true) {
continue
}
// Unverified results that look like hashes are probably not secrets
if falsePositiveSecretCheck.MatchString(resSecretMatch) {
continue
}
}
results = append(results, s1)
// If we've found a verified match with this ID, we don't need to look for any more. So move on to the next ID.
if s1.Verified {
break
}
}
}
return awsCustomCleanResults(results), nil
}
func (s scanner) verifyMatch(ctx context.Context, resIDMatch, resSecretMatch string, retryOn403 bool) (bool, map[string]string, error) {
// REQUEST VALUES.
method := "GET"
service := "sts"
host := "sts.amazonaws.com"
region := "us-east-1"
endpoint := "https://sts.amazonaws.com"
now := time.Now().UTC()
datestamp := now.Format("20060102")
amzDate := now.Format("20060102T150405Z0700")
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, endpoint, nil)
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
// TASK 1: CREATE A CANONICAL REQUEST.
// http://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/sigv4-create-canonical-request.html
canonicalURI := "/"
canonicalHeaders := "host:" + host + "\n"
signedHeaders := "host"
algorithm := "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256"
credentialScope := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s/%s/aws4_request", datestamp, region, service)
params := req.URL.Query()
params.Add("Action", "GetCallerIdentity")
params.Add("Version", "2011-06-15")
params.Add("X-Amz-Algorithm", algorithm)
params.Add("X-Amz-Credential", resIDMatch+"/"+credentialScope)
params.Add("X-Amz-Date", amzDate)
params.Add("X-Amz-Expires", "30")
params.Add("X-Amz-SignedHeaders", signedHeaders)
canonicalQuerystring := params.Encode()
payloadHash := GetHash("") // empty payload
canonicalRequest := method + "\n" + canonicalURI + "\n" + canonicalQuerystring + "\n" + canonicalHeaders + "\n" + signedHeaders + "\n" + payloadHash
// TASK 2: CREATE THE STRING TO SIGN.
stringToSign := algorithm + "\n" + amzDate + "\n" + credentialScope + "\n" + GetHash(canonicalRequest)
// TASK 3: CALCULATE THE SIGNATURE.
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/sigv4-calculate-signature.html
hash := GetHMAC([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("AWS4%s", resSecretMatch)), []byte(datestamp))
hash = GetHMAC(hash, []byte(region))
hash = GetHMAC(hash, []byte(service))
hash = GetHMAC(hash, []byte("aws4_request"))
signature2 := GetHMAC(hash, []byte(stringToSign)) // Get Signature HMAC SHA256
signature := hex.EncodeToString(signature2)
// TASK 4: ADD SIGNING INFORMATION TO THE REQUEST.
params.Add("X-Amz-Signature", signature)
req.Header.Add("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8")
req.URL.RawQuery = params.Encode()
client := s.verificationClient
if client == nil {
client = defaultVerificationClient
}
extraData := map[string]string{
"rotation_guide": "https://howtorotate.com/docs/tutorials/aws/",
}
res, err := client.Do(req)
if err == nil {
defer res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode >= 200 && res.StatusCode < 300 {
identityInfo := identityRes{}
err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&identityInfo)
if err == nil {
extraData["account"] = identityInfo.GetCallerIdentityResponse.GetCallerIdentityResult.Account
extraData["user_id"] = identityInfo.GetCallerIdentityResponse.GetCallerIdentityResult.UserID
extraData["arn"] = identityInfo.GetCallerIdentityResponse.GetCallerIdentityResult.Arn
return true, extraData, nil
} else {
return false, nil, err
}
} else if res.StatusCode == 403 {
// Experimentation has indicated that if you make two GetCallerIdentity requests within five seconds that
// share a key ID but are signed with different secrets the second one will be rejected with a 403 that
// carries a SignatureDoesNotMatch code in its body. This happens even if the second ID-secret pair is
// valid. Since this is exactly our access pattern, we need to work around it.
//
// Fortunately, experimentation has also revealed a workaround: simply resubmit the second request. The
// response to the resubmission will be as expected. But there's a caveat: You can't have closed the body of
// the response to the original second request, or read to its end, or the resubmission will also yield a
// SignatureDoesNotMatch. For this reason, we have to re-request all 403s. We can't re-request only
// SignatureDoesNotMatch responses, because we can only tell whether a given 403 is a SignatureDoesNotMatch
// after decoding its response body, which requires reading the entire response body, which disables the
// workaround.
//
// We are clearly deep in the guts of AWS implementation details here, so this all might change with no
// notice. If you're here because something in this detector broke, you have my condolences.
if retryOn403 {
return s.verifyMatch(ctx, resIDMatch, resSecretMatch, false)
}
var body awsErrorResponseBody
err = json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&body)
if err == nil {
// All instances of the code I've seen in the wild are PascalCased but this check is
// case-insensitive out of an abundance of caution
if strings.EqualFold(body.Error.Code, "InvalidClientTokenId") {
return false, nil, nil
} else {
return false, nil, fmt.Errorf("request returned status %d with an unexpected reason (%s: %s)", res.StatusCode, body.Error.Code, body.Error.Message)
}
} else {
return false, nil, fmt.Errorf("couldn't parse the sts response body (%v)", err)
}
} else {
return false, nil, fmt.Errorf("request to %v returned unexpected status %d", res.Request.URL, res.StatusCode)
}
} else {
return false, nil, err
}
}
func (s scanner) verifyCanary(resIDMatch, resSecretMatch string) (bool, string, error) {
// Prep AWS Creds for SNS
sess := session.Must(session.NewSession(&aws.Config{
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"), // any region seems to work
Credentials: credentials.NewStaticCredentials(
resIDMatch,
resSecretMatch,
"",
),
HTTPClient: s.verificationClient,
}))
svc := sns.New(sess)
// Prep vars and Publish to SNS
_, err := svc.Publish(&sns.PublishInput{
Message: aws.String("foo"),
PhoneNumber: aws.String("1"),
})
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not authorized to perform") {
arn := strings.Split(err.Error(), "User: ")[1]
arn = strings.Split(arn, " is not authorized to perform: ")[0]
return true, arn, nil
} else if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "does not match the signature you provided") {
return false, "", nil
} else if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "status code: 403") {
return false, "", nil
} else {
return false, "", err
}
}
func awsCustomCleanResults(results []detectors.Result) []detectors.Result {
if len(results) == 0 {
return results
}
// For every ID, we want at most one result, preferably verified.
idResults := map[string]detectors.Result{}
for _, result := range results {
// Always accept the verified result as the result for the given ID.
if result.Verified {
idResults[result.Redacted] = result
continue
}
// Only include an unverified result if we don't already have a result for a given ID.
if _, exist := idResults[result.Redacted]; !exist {
idResults[result.Redacted] = result
}
}
var out []detectors.Result
for _, r := range idResults {
out = append(out, r)
}
return out
}
type awsError struct {
Code string `json:"Code"`
Message string `json:"Message"`
}
type awsErrorResponseBody struct {
Error awsError `json:"Error"`
}
type identityRes struct {
GetCallerIdentityResponse struct {
GetCallerIdentityResult struct {
Account string `json:"Account"`
Arn string `json:"Arn"`
UserID string `json:"UserId"`
} `json:"GetCallerIdentityResult"`
ResponseMetadata struct {
RequestID string `json:"RequestId"`
} `json:"ResponseMetadata"`
} `json:"GetCallerIdentityResponse"`
}
func (s scanner) Type() detectorspb.DetectorType {
return detectorspb.DetectorType_AWS
}