Supply Chain Malware #26
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The repo tag-security/supply-chain-security/compromises at main · cncf/tag-security contains samples of most types of supply chain hacks. |
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Yeah - supply chain malware is probably a whole security domain at this point. There are things like https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj and https://github.com/marketplace/actions/owasp-dependency-track-check And there are even meta attacks like https://blog.checkpoint.com/2022/08/03/github-users-targeted-in-supply-chain-attack/ Another reason to add OWASP and/or other scans to the CI pipeline (before PRs are reviewed) |
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FWIIW - starting playing around with native github dependency (supply chain) scans (CodeQL) and dependabot (automatic dependency version updater). Still (a lot) more to understand but it seems like CodeQL is what 'people' are using instead of OWASP on github. ? From a distance it seems fine. Does anyone have more experience with CodeQL? Here a few links for VoteTracker+ which is where I am spelunking: This list of dependencies CodeQL finds: https://github.com/TrustTheVote-Project/VTP-root-repo/network/dependencies Vulnerability page: https://github.com/TrustTheVote-Project/VTP-root-repo/security/code-scanning |
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FYI - got this today - sending it as you guys may not have the access rights into security issues in the repo |
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Nice to see Packj being mentioned. I'm the author. Hello! I'd be happy to demo and work with you to integrate the Github plugin that audits PRs for malicious/"risky" packages. Only looking for feedback on how to improve the tool. Thanks! |
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This week, two separate supply chain hacks were discovered on PyPi.org. From BleepingComputer.com - Technology news:
In both cases, the packages were removed from the PyPi.org registry, but not before several hundred (or more) developers downloaded the packages.
This list is not comprehensive, and may not even cover all of the malicious code on PyPi that was discovered this week, to say nothing of all of the malicious code that's still there in the PyPi.org registry, yet to be discovered.
The issue for OSET is simple: these kinds of supply chain injections could be immensely damaging to the security of OSET code, and OSET's reputation.
This is not just a language specific problem for Python, but for any language that allows developers to download code from public registries or repositories. Similar attacks, for example, have plagued npm within the last year, as well:
What are some of the ways OSET can prevent these kinds of attacks? Post your ideas here.
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