@@ -189,6 +189,19 @@ or block layouts that are insecure. However, tools that integrate into in-toto
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may independently block or make judgments about the security of a specific
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layout.
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+ in-toto has been designed to verify the integrity of the software supply chain
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+ as a whole. However,
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+ [ certain scenarios] ( https://github.com/in-toto/docs/security/advisories/GHSA-p86f-xmg6-9q4x )
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+ may necessitate partial verification of a supply chain as it is executed.
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+ Adopters may deploy custom verification workflows or create layouts that are a
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+ subset of the full layout to enable partial verification of the supply chain
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+ prior to performing some step. The specifics of these deployments, however, are
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+ considered out of scope for the in-toto specification. Note that such scenarios
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+ may also be addressed with sufficient separation between components generating
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+ in-toto metadata and those executing a supply chain step. For example, in-toto's
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+ reference implementation provides the in-toto-record tool that can be used for
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+ such separation.
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+
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Finally, in-toto inherently does not protect against attackers replaying older,
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as-yet unexpired layouts. To ensure the right layouts are used during the
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verification workflow, we recommend using a system like
@@ -207,6 +220,9 @@ For cases where trust delegation is meaningful, a functionary should be able to
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delegate full or limited trust to other functionaries to perform steps on their
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behalf.
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+ Finally, we recommend separating the mechanisms responsible for in-toto metadata
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+ generation from those executing the steps themselves.
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+
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#### 1.5.4 System properties
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To achieve the goals stated above, we anticipate a system with the following
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