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Utini2000 opened this issue Dec 30, 2020 · 1 comment
Open

Question regarding sysctl network parameters #55

Utini2000 opened this issue Dec 30, 2020 · 1 comment
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question Further information is requested

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@Utini2000
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Hello everyone,
today I read this guide and double checked its recommendations with the parameters from linux-hardened:
https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl-network

I noticed that some of the network parameters in linux-hardened are not as strict/secure as recommended in the guide.
Is this on purpose or are those values that might need some tuning in the future?

Just wanted to give a hint to it in case it has been "overseen" :-)

Thanks!

@anthraxx anthraxx added the question Further information is requested label Jan 8, 2021
@five23
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five23 commented Jul 18, 2021

Some notes on the discrepancies:

net.ipv4.tcp_sack=0

Disabling this can cause TCP congestion on higher latency connections such as WiFi. Instead try blocking connections with a low MSS using iptables => iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcpmss --mss 1:500 -j DROP (https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000019472).

net.ipv4.tcp_dsack=0

Hmm, not sure about this one. DSACK informs the sender of duplicate arrivals so I don't think disabling it would make any difference to a malicious sender?

net.ipv4.tcp_fack=0

This option is deprecated and has no effect (see: https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt)

net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all=1

Generally it's better to respond to ping requests and instead configure your router to ignore packets where the source address is a broadcast address, et. al. The defaults here make sense to me.

anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 13, 2022
[ Upstream commit 059a47f ]

After rx/tx ring buffer size is changed, kernel panic occurs when
it acts XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT.

When tx/rx ring buffer size is changed(ethtool -G), sfc driver
reallocates and reinitializes rx and tx queues and their buffer
(tx_queue->buffer).
But it misses reinitializing xdp queues(efx->xdp_tx_queues).
So, while it is acting XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it uses the uninitialized
tx_queue->buffer.

A new function efx_set_xdp_channels() is separated from efx_set_channels()
to handle only xdp queues.

Splat looks like:
   BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002a
   #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
   #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
   PGD 0 P4D 0
   Oops: 0002 [#4] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
   RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
   CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G      D           5.17.0+ #55 e8beeee8289528f11357029357cf
   Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
   RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e45c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
   RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
   RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea506895c0 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001139b10ce RDI: ffff92ea506895c0
   RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001139b110d R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
   R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001139b10ce R15: ffff92ea506895c0
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
   CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
   RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e85c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
   PKRU: 55555554
   RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea50689700 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001145a90ce RDI: ffff92ea50689700
   RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001145a910d R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
   R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001145a90ce R15: ffff92ea50689700
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810005 CR4: 00000000007706e0
   PKRU: 55555554
   Call Trace:
    <IRQ>
    efx_xdp_tx_buffers+0x12b/0x3d0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    __efx_rx_packet+0x5c3/0x930 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    efx_rx_packet+0x28c/0x2e0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    efx_ef10_ev_process+0x5f8/0xf40 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    ? enqueue_task_fair+0x95/0x550
    efx_poll+0xc4/0x360 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]

Fixes: 3990a8f ("sfc: allocate channels for XDP tx queues")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 13, 2022
[ Upstream commit 059a47f ]

After rx/tx ring buffer size is changed, kernel panic occurs when
it acts XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT.

When tx/rx ring buffer size is changed(ethtool -G), sfc driver
reallocates and reinitializes rx and tx queues and their buffer
(tx_queue->buffer).
But it misses reinitializing xdp queues(efx->xdp_tx_queues).
So, while it is acting XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it uses the uninitialized
tx_queue->buffer.

A new function efx_set_xdp_channels() is separated from efx_set_channels()
to handle only xdp queues.

Splat looks like:
   BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002a
   #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
   #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
   PGD 0 P4D 0
   Oops: 0002 [#4] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
   RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
   CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G      D           5.17.0+ #55 e8beeee8289528f11357029357cf
   Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
   RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e45c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
   RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
   RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea506895c0 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001139b10ce RDI: ffff92ea506895c0
   RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001139b110d R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
   R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001139b10ce R15: ffff92ea506895c0
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
   CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
   RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e85c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
   PKRU: 55555554
   RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea50689700 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001145a90ce RDI: ffff92ea50689700
   RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001145a910d R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
   R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001145a90ce R15: ffff92ea50689700
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810005 CR4: 00000000007706e0
   PKRU: 55555554
   Call Trace:
    <IRQ>
    efx_xdp_tx_buffers+0x12b/0x3d0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    __efx_rx_packet+0x5c3/0x930 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    efx_rx_packet+0x28c/0x2e0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    efx_ef10_ev_process+0x5f8/0xf40 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    ? enqueue_task_fair+0x95/0x550
    efx_poll+0xc4/0x360 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]

Fixes: 3990a8f ("sfc: allocate channels for XDP tx queues")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 30, 2022
[ Upstream commit 059a47f ]

After rx/tx ring buffer size is changed, kernel panic occurs when
it acts XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT.

When tx/rx ring buffer size is changed(ethtool -G), sfc driver
reallocates and reinitializes rx and tx queues and their buffer
(tx_queue->buffer).
But it misses reinitializing xdp queues(efx->xdp_tx_queues).
So, while it is acting XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it uses the uninitialized
tx_queue->buffer.

A new function efx_set_xdp_channels() is separated from efx_set_channels()
to handle only xdp queues.

Splat looks like:
   BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002a
   #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
   #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
   PGD 0 P4D 0
   Oops: 0002 [#4] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
   RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
   CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G      D           5.17.0+ #55 e8beeee8289528f11357029357cf
   Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
   RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e45c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
   RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
   RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea506895c0 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001139b10ce RDI: ffff92ea506895c0
   RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001139b110d R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
   R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001139b10ce R15: ffff92ea506895c0
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
   CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
   RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e85c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
   PKRU: 55555554
   RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea50689700 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001145a90ce RDI: ffff92ea50689700
   RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001145a910d R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
   R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001145a90ce R15: ffff92ea50689700
   FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810005 CR4: 00000000007706e0
   PKRU: 55555554
   Call Trace:
    <IRQ>
    efx_xdp_tx_buffers+0x12b/0x3d0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    __efx_rx_packet+0x5c3/0x930 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    efx_rx_packet+0x28c/0x2e0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    efx_ef10_ev_process+0x5f8/0xf40 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
    ? enqueue_task_fair+0x95/0x550
    efx_poll+0xc4/0x360 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]

Fixes: 3990a8f ("sfc: allocate channels for XDP tx queues")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 9, 2022
[ Upstream commit d28ea55 ]

Add calls to drm_bridge_add()/drm_bridge_remove() DRM bridges created by
the driver. This fixes the following warning.

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:579 __mutex_lock+0x840/0x9f4
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00002-g3054695a0d27-dirty #55
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
 unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70
 dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0xc8/0x1e8
 __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x78/0xa8
 warn_slowpath_fmt from __mutex_lock+0x840/0x9f4
 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24
 mutex_lock_nested from drm_bridge_hpd_enable+0x2c/0x84
 drm_bridge_hpd_enable from msm_hdmi_modeset_init+0xc0/0x21c
 msm_hdmi_modeset_init from mdp4_kms_init+0x53c/0x90c
 mdp4_kms_init from msm_drm_bind+0x514/0x698
 msm_drm_bind from try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x160/0x1bc
 try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device from component_master_add_with_match+0xc4/0xf8
 component_master_add_with_match from msm_pdev_probe+0x274/0x350
 msm_pdev_probe from platform_probe+0x5c/0xbc
 platform_probe from really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x290
 really_probe.part.0 from __driver_probe_device+0xa8/0x13c
 __driver_probe_device from driver_probe_device+0x34/0x10c
 driver_probe_device from __driver_attach+0xbc/0x178
 __driver_attach from bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc0
 bus_for_each_dev from bus_add_driver+0x160/0x1e4
 bus_add_driver from driver_register+0x88/0x118
 driver_register from do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x334
 do_one_initcall from kernel_init_freeable+0x1bc/0x220
 kernel_init_freeable from kernel_init+0x18/0x12c
 kernel_init from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c

Fixes: 3d3f8b1 ("drm/bridge: make bridge registration independent of drm flow")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Abhinav Kumar <[email protected]>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/481778/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 9, 2022
[ Upstream commit d28ea55 ]

Add calls to drm_bridge_add()/drm_bridge_remove() DRM bridges created by
the driver. This fixes the following warning.

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:579 __mutex_lock+0x840/0x9f4
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-00002-g3054695a0d27-dirty #55
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
 unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70
 dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0xc8/0x1e8
 __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x78/0xa8
 warn_slowpath_fmt from __mutex_lock+0x840/0x9f4
 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24
 mutex_lock_nested from drm_bridge_hpd_enable+0x2c/0x84
 drm_bridge_hpd_enable from msm_hdmi_modeset_init+0xc0/0x21c
 msm_hdmi_modeset_init from mdp4_kms_init+0x53c/0x90c
 mdp4_kms_init from msm_drm_bind+0x514/0x698
 msm_drm_bind from try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x160/0x1bc
 try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device from component_master_add_with_match+0xc4/0xf8
 component_master_add_with_match from msm_pdev_probe+0x274/0x350
 msm_pdev_probe from platform_probe+0x5c/0xbc
 platform_probe from really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x290
 really_probe.part.0 from __driver_probe_device+0xa8/0x13c
 __driver_probe_device from driver_probe_device+0x34/0x10c
 driver_probe_device from __driver_attach+0xbc/0x178
 __driver_attach from bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc0
 bus_for_each_dev from bus_add_driver+0x160/0x1e4
 bus_add_driver from driver_register+0x88/0x118
 driver_register from do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x334
 do_one_initcall from kernel_init_freeable+0x1bc/0x220
 kernel_init_freeable from kernel_init+0x18/0x12c
 kernel_init from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c

Fixes: 3d3f8b1 ("drm/bridge: make bridge registration independent of drm flow")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Abhinav Kumar <[email protected]>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/481778/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit dbc153f ]

A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced
by following steps:

- run nginx/wrk test:
  smc_run nginx
  smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL>

- continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel:
  watch -n 1 'smcss -D'

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G	E      6.7.0+ #55
 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die+0x24/0x70
  ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150
  ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
  ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430
  ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170
  smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag]
  smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag]
  netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320
  __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300
  smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag]
  ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag]
  sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140
  ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110
  sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420
  __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300
  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0
  ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160
  ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100
  ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

It is possible that the connection is in process of being established
when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a
link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been
initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to
conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump.

Fixes: 4b1b7d3 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit dbc153f ]

A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced
by following steps:

- run nginx/wrk test:
  smc_run nginx
  smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL>

- continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel:
  watch -n 1 'smcss -D'

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G	E      6.7.0+ #55
 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die+0x24/0x70
  ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150
  ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
  ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430
  ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170
  smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag]
  smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag]
  netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320
  __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300
  smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag]
  ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag]
  sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140
  ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110
  sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420
  __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300
  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0
  ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160
  ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100
  ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

It is possible that the connection is in process of being established
when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a
link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been
initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to
conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump.

Fixes: 4b1b7d3 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit dbc153f ]

A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced
by following steps:

- run nginx/wrk test:
  smc_run nginx
  smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL>

- continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel:
  watch -n 1 'smcss -D'

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G	E      6.7.0+ #55
 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die+0x24/0x70
  ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150
  ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
  ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430
  ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170
  smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag]
  smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag]
  netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320
  __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300
  smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag]
  ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag]
  sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140
  ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110
  sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420
  __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300
  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0
  ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160
  ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100
  ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

It is possible that the connection is in process of being established
when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a
link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been
initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to
conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump.

Fixes: 4b1b7d3 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 24, 2024
[ Upstream commit dbc153f ]

A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced
by following steps:

- run nginx/wrk test:
  smc_run nginx
  smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL>

- continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel:
  watch -n 1 'smcss -D'

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G	E      6.7.0+ #55
 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die+0x24/0x70
  ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150
  ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
  ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430
  ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170
  smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag]
  smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag]
  netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320
  __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300
  smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag]
  ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag]
  sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140
  ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110
  sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420
  __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300
  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0
  ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160
  ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100
  ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

It is possible that the connection is in process of being established
when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a
link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been
initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to
conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump.

Fixes: 4b1b7d3 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 24, 2024
[ Upstream commit dbc153f ]

A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced
by following steps:

- run nginx/wrk test:
  smc_run nginx
  smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL>

- continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel:
  watch -n 1 'smcss -D'

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G	E      6.7.0+ #55
 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die+0x24/0x70
  ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150
  ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
  ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430
  ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170
  smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag]
  smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag]
  netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320
  __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300
  smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag]
  ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag]
  sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140
  ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110
  sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420
  __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300
  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0
  ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160
  ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100
  ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

It is possible that the connection is in process of being established
when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a
link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been
initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to
conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump.

Fixes: 4b1b7d3 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 24, 2024
[ Upstream commit dbc153f ]

A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced
by following steps:

- run nginx/wrk test:
  smc_run nginx
  smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL>

- continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel:
  watch -n 1 'smcss -D'

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G	E      6.7.0+ #55
 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die+0x24/0x70
  ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150
  ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
  ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430
  ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170
  smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag]
  smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag]
  netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320
  __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300
  smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag]
  ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag]
  sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140
  ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110
  sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420
  __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300
  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0
  ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160
  ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100
  ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

It is possible that the connection is in process of being established
when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a
link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been
initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to
conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump.

Fixes: 4b1b7d3 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 24, 2024
[ Upstream commit dbc153f ]

A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced
by following steps:

- run nginx/wrk test:
  smc_run nginx
  smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL>

- continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel:
  watch -n 1 'smcss -D'

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G	E      6.7.0+ #55
 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die+0x24/0x70
  ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150
  ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
  ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430
  ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170
  smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag]
  smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag]
  netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320
  __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300
  smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag]
  ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag]
  sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140
  ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110
  sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420
  __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300
  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0
  ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160
  ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100
  ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0
  __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

It is possible that the connection is in process of being established
when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a
link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been
initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to
conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump.

Fixes: 4b1b7d3 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 23, 2025
…_bind returns err

[ Upstream commit 36684e9 ]

The pointer need to be set to NULL, otherwise KASAN complains about
use-after-free. Because in mtk_drm_bind, all private's drm are set
as follows.

private->all_drm_private[i]->drm = drm;

And drm will be released by drm_dev_put in case mtk_drm_kms_init returns
failure. However, the shutdown path still accesses the previous allocated
memory in drm_atomic_helper_shutdown.

[   84.874820] watchdog: watchdog0: watchdog did not stop!
[   86.512054] ==================================================================
[   86.513162] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in drm_atomic_helper_shutdown+0x33c/0x378
[   86.514258] Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000d46fc068 by task shutdown/1
[   86.515213]
[   86.515455] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: shutdown Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-mtk+gfa1a78e5d24b-dirty #55
[   86.516752] Hardware name: Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2022.10 10/01/2022
[   86.517960] Call trace:
[   86.518333]  show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C)
[   86.518891]  dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0
[   86.519443]  print_report+0xf8/0x5b0
[   86.519985]  kasan_report+0xb4/0x100
[   86.520526]  __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x30
[   86.521240]  drm_atomic_helper_shutdown+0x33c/0x378
[   86.521966]  mtk_drm_shutdown+0x54/0x80
[   86.522546]  platform_shutdown+0x64/0x90
[   86.523137]  device_shutdown+0x260/0x5b8
[   86.523728]  kernel_restart+0x78/0xf0
[   86.524282]  __do_sys_reboot+0x258/0x2f0
[   86.524871]  __arm64_sys_reboot+0x90/0xd8
[   86.525473]  invoke_syscall+0x74/0x268
[   86.526041]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x240
[   86.526751]  do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x70
[   86.527251]  el0_svc+0x4c/0xc0
[   86.527719]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x144/0x168
[   86.528367]  el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0
[   86.528920]
[   86.529157] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   86.529972] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff0000d46fd4d0 pfn:0x1146fc
[   86.531319] flags: 0xbfffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff)
[   86.532267] raw: 0bfffc0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[   86.533390] raw: ffff0000d46fd4d0 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   86.534511] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   86.535323]
[   86.535559] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   86.536265]  ffff0000d46fbf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   86.537314]  ffff0000d46fbf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   86.538363] >ffff0000d46fc000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   86.544733]                                                           ^
[   86.551057]  ffff0000d46fc080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   86.557510]  ffff0000d46fc100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   86.563928] ==================================================================
[   86.571093] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   86.577642] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address e0e9c0920000000b
[   86.581834] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0752049000000058-0x075204900000005f]
...

Fixes: 1ef7ed4 ("drm/mediatek: Modify mediatek-drm for mt8195 multi mmsys support")
Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/dri-devel/patch/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Chun-Kuang Hu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 23, 2025
…_bind returns err

[ Upstream commit 36684e9 ]

The pointer need to be set to NULL, otherwise KASAN complains about
use-after-free. Because in mtk_drm_bind, all private's drm are set
as follows.

private->all_drm_private[i]->drm = drm;

And drm will be released by drm_dev_put in case mtk_drm_kms_init returns
failure. However, the shutdown path still accesses the previous allocated
memory in drm_atomic_helper_shutdown.

[   84.874820] watchdog: watchdog0: watchdog did not stop!
[   86.512054] ==================================================================
[   86.513162] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in drm_atomic_helper_shutdown+0x33c/0x378
[   86.514258] Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000d46fc068 by task shutdown/1
[   86.515213]
[   86.515455] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: shutdown Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-mtk+gfa1a78e5d24b-dirty #55
[   86.516752] Hardware name: Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2022.10 10/01/2022
[   86.517960] Call trace:
[   86.518333]  show_stack+0x20/0x38 (C)
[   86.518891]  dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0
[   86.519443]  print_report+0xf8/0x5b0
[   86.519985]  kasan_report+0xb4/0x100
[   86.520526]  __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x30
[   86.521240]  drm_atomic_helper_shutdown+0x33c/0x378
[   86.521966]  mtk_drm_shutdown+0x54/0x80
[   86.522546]  platform_shutdown+0x64/0x90
[   86.523137]  device_shutdown+0x260/0x5b8
[   86.523728]  kernel_restart+0x78/0xf0
[   86.524282]  __do_sys_reboot+0x258/0x2f0
[   86.524871]  __arm64_sys_reboot+0x90/0xd8
[   86.525473]  invoke_syscall+0x74/0x268
[   86.526041]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x240
[   86.526751]  do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x70
[   86.527251]  el0_svc+0x4c/0xc0
[   86.527719]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x144/0x168
[   86.528367]  el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0
[   86.528920]
[   86.529157] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   86.529972] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff0000d46fd4d0 pfn:0x1146fc
[   86.531319] flags: 0xbfffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff)
[   86.532267] raw: 0bfffc0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[   86.533390] raw: ffff0000d46fd4d0 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   86.534511] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   86.535323]
[   86.535559] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   86.536265]  ffff0000d46fbf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   86.537314]  ffff0000d46fbf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   86.538363] >ffff0000d46fc000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   86.544733]                                                           ^
[   86.551057]  ffff0000d46fc080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   86.557510]  ffff0000d46fc100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[   86.563928] ==================================================================
[   86.571093] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   86.577642] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address e0e9c0920000000b
[   86.581834] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0752049000000058-0x075204900000005f]
...

Fixes: 1ef7ed4 ("drm/mediatek: Modify mediatek-drm for mt8195 multi mmsys support")
Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/dri-devel/patch/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Chun-Kuang Hu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 8, 2025
commit b150654 upstream.

Commit <d74169ceb0d2> ("iommu/vt-d: Allocate DMAR fault interrupts
locally") moved the call to enable_drhd_fault_handling() to a code
path that does not hold any lock while traversing the drhd list. Fix
it by ensuring the dmar_global_lock lock is held when traversing the
drhd list.

Without this fix, the following warning is triggered:
 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.14.0-rc3 #55 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c:2046 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
               other info that might help us debug this:
               rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
 2 locks held by cpuhp/1/23:
 #0: ffffffff84a67c50 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0
 #1: ffffffff84a6a380 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0
 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 23 Comm: cpuhp/1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3 #55
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xd0
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x159/0x1f0
  ? __pfx_enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x10/0x10
  enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x151/0x180
  cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x1df/0x990
  cpuhp_thread_fun+0x1ea/0x2c0
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x1f5/0x2e0
  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
  kthread+0x12a/0x2d0
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x60
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  </TASK>

Holding the lock in enable_drhd_fault_handling() triggers a lockdep splat
about a possible deadlock between dmar_global_lock and cpu_hotplug_lock.
This is avoided by not holding dmar_global_lock when calling
iommu_device_register(), which initiates the device probe process.

Fixes: d74169c ("iommu/vt-d: Allocate DMAR fault interrupts locally")
Reported-and-tested-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/[email protected]/
Tested-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
anthraxx pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 8, 2025
commit b150654 upstream.

Commit <d74169ceb0d2> ("iommu/vt-d: Allocate DMAR fault interrupts
locally") moved the call to enable_drhd_fault_handling() to a code
path that does not hold any lock while traversing the drhd list. Fix
it by ensuring the dmar_global_lock lock is held when traversing the
drhd list.

Without this fix, the following warning is triggered:
 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.14.0-rc3 #55 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c:2046 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
               other info that might help us debug this:
               rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
 2 locks held by cpuhp/1/23:
 #0: ffffffff84a67c50 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0
 #1: ffffffff84a6a380 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0
 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 23 Comm: cpuhp/1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3 #55
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xd0
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x159/0x1f0
  ? __pfx_enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x10/0x10
  enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x151/0x180
  cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x1df/0x990
  cpuhp_thread_fun+0x1ea/0x2c0
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x1f5/0x2e0
  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
  kthread+0x12a/0x2d0
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x60
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  </TASK>

Holding the lock in enable_drhd_fault_handling() triggers a lockdep splat
about a possible deadlock between dmar_global_lock and cpu_hotplug_lock.
This is avoided by not holding dmar_global_lock when calling
iommu_device_register(), which initiates the device probe process.

Fixes: d74169c ("iommu/vt-d: Allocate DMAR fault interrupts locally")
Reported-and-tested-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/[email protected]/
Tested-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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